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Abstract
Background: The experience of previous sizable outbreaks may affect travelers’ decisions to 
travel to an area with an ongoing outbreak.
Methods: We estimated changes in monthly numbers of visitors to the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
in 2015 compared to projected values by selected areas. We tested whether areas’ experience of a 
previous SARS outbreak of ≥100 cases or distance to the ROK had a significant effect on travel to 
the ROK during the MERS outbreak using t-tests and regression models.
Results: The percentage changes in visitors from areas with a previous SARS outbreak of ≥100 
cases decreased more than the percentage changes in visitors from their counterparts in June 
(52.4% vs. 23.3%) and July (60.0% vs. 31.4%) during the 2015 MERS outbreak. The percentage 
changes in visitors from the close and intermediate categories decreased more than the far 
category. The results from regression models and sensitivity analyses demonstrated that areas with 
≥100 SARS cases and closer proximity to the ROK had significantly larger percentage decreases 
in traveler volumes during the outbreak.
Conclusions: During the 2015 MERS outbreak, areas with a previous sizable SARS outbreak 
and areas near the ROK showed greater decreases in percentage changes in visitors to the ROK.
1. BACKGROUND
The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) was initiated by the arrival of a single infected international traveler who visited the 
Middle East [1]. The first case was confirmed on May 20, 2015, and the outbreak resulted in 
186 cases and 38 deaths before the government of the ROK and the World Health 
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Organization (WHO) officially announced the end of the outbreak on December 23, 2015 
[2].
During the 2015 MERS outbreak, the ROK government conducted entry screening and 
active monitoring of all travelers from the Middle East region to avoid additional 
importations of MERS cases [2]. In addition, the ROK government restricted international 
departures by confirmed or suspected MERS patients or their contacts to prevent the global 
spread of MERS [2]. Although WHO did not recommend any travel restrictions or entry 
screening for MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [3], the numbers of international travelers 
visiting the ROK decreased significantly during the 2015 MERS outbreak [4, 5].
Fear-induced behavioral changes during novel infectious disease outbreaks have been 
reported to depend on an individual’s perception of risk rather than the actual risk [6]. One 
factor that could affect an individual’s perception of the risk of an infectious disease 
outbreak is the individual’s previous experience of a similar infectious disease outbreak. 
Governments of countries that had a similar sizable outbreak, as well as individuals from 
those countries, may have responded differently to the ROK MERS outbreak than 
governments or individuals who had less exposure to a similar sizable outbreak.
This evaluation estimates the changes in numbers of non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals 
from selected areas to the ROK during the 2015 MERS outbreak and examines the 
correlation between travel volume declines and previous experience of the most similar 
sizable outbreak, the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. We also 
examined the correlation between decrease in travel volume and proximity to the ROK.
2. METHODS
We used monthly international traveler statistics from TOURGO, the Korea tourism 
knowledge and information system, maintained by the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute 
[7]. The data include numbers of inbound non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals by area 
following the international guideline from the United Nations World Tourism Organization 
[7]. The numbers of arrivals reported in this analysis are limited to the numbers of non-
citizen short-term visitor arrivals.
Each area includes one country or political unit. Note that area information in the data set is 
based on travelers’ passports rather than the areas from which travelers departed. First, we 
selected areas comprising more than 0.5% of total non-citizen visitor arrivals, i.e. more than 
70 000 visitors to the ROK during 2014. Selected areas in descending order of numbers of 
arrivals to the ROK during 2014 are China (mainland China excluding Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR), Macau, and Taiwan), Japan, United States (USA), Taiwan–
China, Hong Kong SAR–China, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Russia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, India, Canada, Vietnam, Australia, United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and France. 
They combined to contribute 94% of the total number of arrivals to the ROK during 2014. 
Monthly actual numbers of arrivals in 2015 by area from TOURGO are shown in Appendix 
Table 1.
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For each area, we compared monthly numbers of arrivals in 2015 to the monthly average 
numbers of arrivals in 2013 and 2014. The baseline percentage change in numbers of arrivals 
(y) of each area to the ROK by month was calculated from the projected values (averages of 
2013 and 2014) subtracted from the actual values (2015) and then divided by the projected 
values as shown in the following equation:
yi j =
Actual (with the MERS outbreak)i j − Pro jected (i f there was no MERS outbreak)i j
Pro jected (i f there was no MERS outbreak)i j
× 100%
where “i” stands for each area, while “j” stands for each month during the ROK MERS 
outbreak from June 2015 to December 2015. If the actual value is smaller than the projected 
value in a given area-month, i.e. decreasing arrivals associated with the MERS outbreak, the 
negative value yij corresponds to the estimated percentage decrease in visitor arrivals. The 
number of travelers for each area in each month were treated as a single observation. We 
assumed that any changes of numbers of arrivals caused by the MERS outbreak would be 
observed starting in June because the first MERS case was confirmed on May 20, 2015.
We chose two main variables that could affect individuals’ decisions to travel to an outbreak 
area. The first variable was whether an area had a sizable outbreak of limited duration of a 
novel viral respiratory disease before the 2015 MERS outbreak. The 2003 SARS outbreak 
was chosen because it was sizable including local transmission and its duration was limited 
[8]. During the 2003 SARS outbreak, more than 8 000 individuals were infected worldwide 
with a 9.6% average case fatality rate [9]. In addition, SARS and MERS are both viral 
respiratory infections caused by coronaviruses, although the case fatality rates reported for 
SARS were lower than for MERS [10]. Community transmission of SARS was more 
commonly reported, while MERS transmission in the ROK occurred primarily in healthcare 
settings or through close contact, e.g. caring for or living with an infected person [10, 11]. 
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was also caused by viral respiratory infection; however, 
country-specific H1N1 attack rates were orders of magnitude higher and its case fatality rate 
was much lower compared to the limited-duration outbreaks of SARS and MERS [10, 12, 
13].
Using WHO data for reported numbers of probable SARS cases by area during the 2003 
outbreak [9], we hypothesized that individuals from areas with ≥100 SARS cases during the 
2003 outbreak may have been significantly more or less likely to visit the ROK during the 
2015 MERS outbreak. China, Taiwan–China, Singapore, Canada, and Hong Kong SAR–
China each had ≥100 SARS cases during the 2003 outbreak, and all of those areas were 
included in the current analyses. Although the threshold was set at 100 probable SARS 
cases, each of the five areas experienced at least 238 probable SARS cases, while the 
country/area with next highest number of probable SARS cases, Vietnam, had 64 cases 
(Appendix Figure 3) [9]. Thus, our results would be consistent with any threshold set 
between 65 cases and 237 WHO-reported probable cases.
The second variable we considered was travel distance to the ROK from each area. Since 
travel time cost is likely to be correlated to travel distance between two areas, the 
opportunity cost to change travel plans from a more distant place to the ROK would be 
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expected to be higher. Thus, individuals from more distant areas might be less likely to 
cancel trips to the ROK during the outbreak period. We subdivided selected areas into three 
groups based on distance to the ROK: (1) close (China, Japan, Taiwan–China, and Hong 
Kong SAR–China), (2) intermediate (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
India, and Vietnam), and (3) far (USA, Russia, Canada, Australia, UK, Germany, and 
France). More details about how we defined distance categories for analyses are shown in 
Appendix Tables 2 and 3.
For both variables, we performed Welch’s t-tests for two samples with unequal variances 
[14] to examine whether the monthly average percentage decreases in numbers of arrivals 
from each category differed significantly. For the SARS variable, the null hypothesis is that 
the simple average percentage change of arrivals from areas with <100 SARS cases 
(reference) was the same as the percentage change of arrivals for areas with ≥100 SARS 
cases. The alternative hypothesis is that the percentage decreases for arrivals from areas with 
≥100 SARS cases were larger than for areas with <100 SARS cases. For the distance 
categories, the null hypothesis is that the simple average percentage change of arrivals from 
the far category (reference) was the same as the percentage change of arrivals from the 
intermediate or the close category. The alternative hypothesis is that the percentage 
decreases for arrivals from areas in the far category were smaller than for arrivals from the 
areas in the intermediate or the close categories. When p-values from Welch’s t-tests are 
<0.05, we reject the null hypotheses in favor of the alternative hypotheses.
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to examine the impact of each 
factor on percentage changes in numbers of visitor arrivals for each month during the ROK 
MERS outbreak (June–December 2015). The following equation was used in an OLS 
regression model.
yi j = αSARSi + β1closei + β2Intermediatei + β0
“yij” is a dependent variable that shows percentage changes in numbers of arrivals by area-
month. “SARSi” is a dummy variable, which is one when an area “i” reported ≥100 SARS 
cases during the 2003 outbreak, otherwise zero. “Closei” is a dummy variable, which is one 
when an area “i” is in the “Close” category, otherwise zero. “Intermediatei” is an additional 
distance dummy variable. When an area “i” is in the “Intermediate” category, the variable is 
one, otherwise zero. In summary, the OLS model included two independent variables: 1) a 
binary variable to identify areas with ≥100 SARS cases during the 2003 outbreak (reference 
category: <100 SARS cases during the 2003 outbreak), and 2) a categorical variable 
summarizing the distance between an area and the ROK that was transformed into two 
binary variables (reference category: “far”).
We conducted sensitivity analyses using alternative projected values. The baseline model 
used the average numbers of arrivals in 2013 and 2014 by area to project the expected 
numbers of arrivals to the ROK in the absence of the outbreak. The baseline model, however, 
may not account for year-to-year increasing or decreasing trends in the numbers of arrivals 
to the ROK. That omission could result in underestimated or overestimated projected values 
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in the absence of the MERS outbreak, causing biased estimates from regression models. 
Thus, we examined two alternative models.
Alternative 1 used projected value based on the monthly average numbers of arrivals from 
each area in 2014 and 2016; i.e. the predicted value in June 2015 is the average number of 
arrivals in June 2014 and June 2016. This alternative assumes that neither 2014 nor 2016 
travel volumes were affected by the MERS outbreak and that the expected monthly travel 
volumes in 2015 in the absence of the outbreak could have approximated the average 
volumes of 2014 and 2016.
For Alternative 2, we again started with the monthly average numbers of arrivals in 2013 and 
2014. Since the ROK MERS outbreak was not expected to affect travel volumes during the 
pre-outbreak period in 2015, we compared the arrivals from January to May 2015 to the 
average number of arrivals from January to May in 2013 and 2014 to calculate an area-
specific adjustment to the projected numbers of arrivals from June to December 2015 in the 
absence of the outbreak. Alternative 2 used the same method that was used to compare 
projected and actual numbers of arrivals in Mexico during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic [15].
To avoid bias, we conducted additional sensitivity analyses by excluding outliers. Potential 
outliers were flagged if any area-month (yij) observation was ≥100% or ≤−100%. We only 
identified one observation that met these outlier criteria. We excluded the observation for 
India in August 2015, when an exceptional increase in the number of crewmembers arriving 
at seaports [16] resulted in an increase of 106.4% relative to the average of arrivals for India 
in August 2013 and 2014.
3. RESULTS
Decreases in numbers of arrivals to the ROK were observed during June and July 2015 
across all examined areas compared to the average numbers of arrivals in 2013 and 2014 
(Table 1). In June, the number of arrivals decreased by 7.5% from the least affected area and 
74.2% from the most affected area. The simple average decrease across 17 areas was 31.4%. 
In July, the simple average decrease in numbers of arrivals was 39.3% (range 4.8% to 82.0% 
across areas). Although travel volumes declined across all areas during June and July, actual 
traveler volumes for some areas exceeded projected values starting in August and continuing 
through December 2015 (Appendix Figures 1 and 2).
Table 2 shows that the percentage decrease in numbers of arrivals from areas with ≥100 
SARS cases during the 2003 SARS outbreak was significantly greater than the decrease 
from areas with <100 SARS cases in June (52.4% vs. 23.3%), July (60.0% vs. 31.4%), and 
August 2015 (28.5% vs. 3.8%). In comparison, during the pre-outbreak January to May 
period, the simple averages from both groups showed higher numbers of arrivals than the 
averages for 2013 and 2014 (Figure 1). The numbers of arrivals from areas with a previous 
SARS outbreak with ≥100 cases were 21.7% to 38.5% higher in January –May 2015 than in 
January –May averages for 2013 and 2014, while the simple averages from areas with <100 
SARS cases were only1.7% to 15.4% higher in January –May 2015 (Table 2).
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The percentage changes in arrivals from areas in the close category decreased more than the 
percentage changes in arrivals in the far category in June (56.1% vs. 19.5%), July (69.9% vs. 
17.1%), and August (35.6% vs. 2.9%) (Figure 2 and Table 3). In addition, the percentage 
changes in arrivals in the intermediate category decreased more than the percentage changes 
in arrivals in the far category in July (44.0% vs. 17.1%). Changes in all other months did not 
show significant differences across distance categories.
The results from baseline OLS regression models also identified statistically significant 
correlations between the percentage decrease of numbers of arrivals and previous SARS 
outbreak of ≥100 cases (Table 4). Areas with a previous SARS outbreak of ≥100 cases 
showed significant correlations in June (p-value = 0.032). Also, the correlation between the 
percentage decrease of numbers of arrivals and distance from the ROK was statistically 
significant. The significant percentage decreases in numbers of visitor arrivals occurred in 
areas in the close category in June (p-value=0.012) and July (p-value≤ 0.001), and in the 
intermediate category in July (p-value≤ 0.001).
Results from sensitivity analyses were consistent with the baseline analysis. For Baseline 
and Alternatives 1, the percentage changes of arrivals from areas with a previous SARS 
outbreak of ≥100 cases showed greater decreases than the percentage changes in arrivals 
from their counterparts in June, July, and August 2015 (Appendix Table 4). For Alternative 
2, the differences between areas with and without a SARS outbreak of ≥100 cases were 
significant in every month from June through December 2015, except for September.
For both Alternatives, declines in numbers of arrivals from areas in the close category were 
larger than for areas in the far category from June to August 2015 (Appendix Table 5). For 
Alternative 1, the declines in arrivals in the intermediate category were significantly larger 
than the declines in arrivals from the far category from April through December 2015, 
except for August. However, if we instead used Alternative 2, the decline in numbers of 
arrivals from the intermediate distance category was statistically significantly greater than 
the far category only in April, June and July 2015.
The results from sensitivity analyses of regression models were also consistent with the 
results from baseline models. Using all three projected values, the percentage decrease of 
arrivals in June and July showed some significant correlations with proximity and previous 
SARS outbreaks of ≥100 cases (Appendix Table 6). When excluding outliers, the 
observation for India in August 2015, the difference in the percentage changes in arrivals 
between the intermediate and far categories was significant; however, when the India, 
August 2015 observation was included in the analysis (i.e. not excluded), the difference 
between the intermediate and far categories was no longer significant (Appendix Table 7).
4. DISCUSSION
Results from the baseline and sensitivity analyses found that the 2015 MERS outbreak in the 
ROK appeared to have a greater effect on travel volumes from areas with ≥100 SARS cases 
in 2003, especially in June and July 2015. Most of the ROK MERS cases were confirmed 
during those 2 months, and the ROK government declared a de facto end to the outbreak on 
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July 28, 2015 by which time no individuals were quarantined because of MERS, nor were 
there any newly confirmed cases [2]. The decrease of arrivals during the 2015 MERS 
outbreak is underscored when we compare the trends of numbers of arrivals before and 
during the 2015 MERS outbreak. Positive values in Tables 1–3 (i.e. increases in arrivals) 
before the 2015 MERS outbreak reflect the general trend that the number of arrivals to the 
ROK would be increasing without the outbreak.
Visitors from areas with a previous SARS outbreak of ≥100 cases may have been more 
likely to change their travel plans because of similarities between SARS and MERS, which 
are both caused by coronaviruses and capable of causing serious respiratory impairment. In 
addition, the governments in areas that experienced previous SARS outbreaks may have had 
stronger restrictions or recommendations about travel to the ROK during the MERS 
outbreak period. Although WHO did not recommend any travel restrictions to the ROK 
during the 2015 MERS outbreak [17], WHO noted that raising awareness about MERS 
among those traveling to affected areas was good public health practice [18]. Some areas 
issued travel notices to inform travelers about the potential risks and risk mitigation 
strategies. Although the intent of notices was not to restrict travel, such notices may have 
raised additional concern among travelers, who may then have decided to cancel their travel 
plans.
For instance, Hong Kong SAR, which showed the biggest percentage difference between 
projected and actual arrivals to the ROK, had experienced a sizable SARS outbreak in 2003 
with 1 755 cases [9]. Hong Kong SAR issued a Red Outbound Travel Alert (OTA) for the 
ROK on June 9, 2015 [19]. Hong Kong’s Red OTA recommends to adjust travel plans or 
avoid non-essential travel and is the second highest level travel notice [20]. The alert was 
lifted on August 1, 2015 [21]. In addition, the Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong 
canceled all tours, excluding cruises, to the ROK that were scheduled to depart from June 9 
to the end of June in 2015 [22]. Since only about 2% of travelers from Hong Kong SAR to 
the ROK arrive via cruise [7], most tourists from Hong Kong SAR were affected by the 
cancellation. In addition, some local governments in mainland China (Sichuan and 
Shandong provinces, and Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province) issued travel 
notices to the ROK because of the 2015 MERS outbreak [23]. Also, some flights between 
China and Jeju international airport in the ROK were cancelled [24].
Taiwan also experienced a sizable SARS outbreak in 2003, and the Taiwan Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) issued a level 2 travel notice (Alert) for Seoul and a level 1 travel 
notice (Watch) for all other areas in the ROK on June 2, 2015 [25]. The level 2 travel notice 
was extended to the entire ROK on June 9, 2015 [26]. The notice included a 
recommendation that travelers avoid unnecessary hospital visits in the ROK [26]. The 
Taiwan CDC lowered its travel notice to level 1 on July 7, 2015 [27], then removed the 
notice on July 28, 2015 [28]. The Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a travel 
alert for MERS to the ROK [29].
The experience with SARS outbreaks in 2003 is only one potential reason that governments 
with previous SARS outbreak experiences may have issued stronger restrictions or 
recommendations about travel to the ROK during the MERS outbreak than governments 
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without previous SARS outbreak experiences. For example, a Korean traveler who was 
experiencing symptoms consistent with MERS pushed ahead with his plan to travel to 
Guangdong, China with a layover in Hong Kong SAR [17]. When this traveler was 
diagnosed with MERS after arrival in China, a public health response was required in China 
[2]. Although there was no further MERS transmission in China or Hong Kong SAR, public 
awareness of this imported case may have exacerbated fear among individuals in Hong Kong 
SAR and Guangdong as well as their local governments. In Taiwan, a patient with suspected 
MERS was reported on May 30, 2015, although this patient was later confirmed to have 
influenza B virus infection [30]. This suspected case was one of 17 suspected MERS cases 
reported in Taiwan between September 2012 and May 2015 [30]. The 17th suspected case 
was in a person who was neither a ROK citizen nor had visited the ROK [30]. However, the 
patient could have increased public awareness of MERS in Taiwan. Although countries 
issued varied levels of travel notices, no countries enforced travel bans or strict quarantine 
requirements for travelers from the ROK as some did for travelers from countries with Ebola 
during the West African epidemic [31].
Since the 2015 MERS outbreak ended, the ROK government has continuously made efforts 
to prevent future MERS outbreaks in the ROK. The Korea Centers for Disease Control & 
Prevention updated its national prevention and control guidelines for MERS in April 2016 
[32]. These guidelines include response plans at airports, hospitals, and local health 
departments to expedite the identification of individuals suspected of MERS-CoV infection 
after arriving from MERS-affected areas [32]. Following the guidelines, virological testing 
for MERS-CoV and other respiratory viruses has been implemented to confirm whether 
individuals with recent travel to MERS-affected areas and symptoms consistent with MERS 
are infected with MERS-CoV or not [32, 33]. Also, the ROK’s amended quarantine act 
specifies MERS as a quarantinable infectious disease [34]. These efforts may decrease the 
risk of future MERS outbreaks in the ROK.
This analysis has some limitations. First, we assumed that the nationality of an individual 
was a proxy for the area of departure for that individual. For instance, a Japanese national 
may live in the United States before visiting the ROK but would be counted as if traveling 
from Japan (close category) for our analysis. Such discrepancies between citizenship and 
residency might cause some bias in examining the effect of distance on travel volumes to the 
ROK during the MERS outbreak.
Next, we were limited in our ability to assess the mechanism by which a previous sizable 
outbreak experience would affect travel to the ROK. As we discussed, issuance of travel 
notices may correlate with past outbreak experience in that governments in countries or 
localities that previously experienced outbreaks may be more likely to issue stronger notices. 
In addition, stronger travel notices in some countries may have correlated with greater 
decreases in travel volumes during the MERS outbreak in the ROK. However, we were 
unable to create categorical variables for issuance of travel notices because each country has 
its own process and terminology for travel notices. Although many countries have similar 
structures for level of travel notices, they are not easily comparable. In addition to level, each 
travel notice contains outbreak-specific recommendations. Recommendations, such as 
avoiding unnecessary hospital visits while in the ROK, further complicate comparisons of 
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the intensity of travel health notices among countries. Thus, we were unable to quantify 
differences between stronger and weaker travel notices across countries. Also, there could be 
other country- or area-specific factors, which could affect travel volumes during a disease 
outbreak, but were not considered in the current analyses.
Last, we chose only one previous outbreak, the 2003 SARS outbreak as an indicator for 
previous outbreak experiences. While SARS was also caused by a novel coronavirus 
resulting in respiratory disease similar to MERS, exposure to other sizable outbreaks, such 
as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic or the 2013–2015 Ebola epidemic, may also have affected 
governments’ and individuals’ perceptions of risk from the 2015 MERS outbreak. Although 
there was a large difference between the top five areas with at least 238 probable SARS 
cases for each and the next highest country with 63 probable SARS cases during the 2013 
outbreak (Appendix Figure 3), a single threshold of ≥100 SARS cases were used. Also, a 
threshold of ≥100 SARS cases was used without considering other potentially critical 
factors, such as population size, the extent of geographic area, the time duration of the SARS 
outbreak, or extent of unlinked community transmission. For instance, both Canada and 
Singapore had ≥100 SARS cases in 2003. However, more than 95% of probable SARS cases 
in Canada (n=247) were observed in the greater Toronto area [35], a small part of Canada, 
while the SARS outbreak in Singapore (n=238) was over the entire country [9]. Thus, 
Canadian governments’ and individuals’ perceptions of risk from the 2015 MERS outbreak 
associated with their SARS outbreak experience could be different from the perception of 
risk from the 2015 MERS outbreak in Singapore.
5. CONCLUSIONS
During the 2015 MERS outbreak, the numbers of arrivals to the ROK from around the world 
decreased. Countries with a previous sizable SARS outbreak and countries closer to the 
ROK had the greatest percentage decreases in travel volumes to the ROK. This is the first 
analysis that has examined area-specific impacts on travel volume to an outbreak area as we 
know. Future research using different outbreak situations may improve our understanding of 
the effects of outbreaks on travel volume.
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Fig. 1. 
Monthly percentage changes of non-citizen arrivals to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2015 
compared with the average of monthly non-citizen arrivals in 2013 and 2014; areas are 
subdivided by whether each had 100 or more severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
cases during the 2003 SARS outbreak
Notes: Non-citizen arrivals are limited to non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals. The solid 
line shows the average percentage changes in monthly numbers of arrivals among areas with 
≥100 SARS cases, while the dotted line is the average percentage changes in numbers of 
arrivals among areas with <100 SARS cases. The shaded area indicates the period between 
the confirmation of the first Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) case in the ROK 
(May 20, 2015) and the declaration of the end of the outbreak by the government of the 
ROK and the World Health Organization (December 23, 2015). The shaded dark gray area 
indicates the peak period of the MERS outbreak, and the shaded light gray area indicates the 
non-peak period. Note that increases in arrivals (i.e. positive values) before the outbreak 
reflect the general trend of increasing numbers of arrivals to the ROK.
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Fig. 2. 
Monthly average percentage changes between actual and projected non-citizen arrivals to the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) during 2015 grouped by distance to the ROK
Notes: Non-citizen arrivals are limited to non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals. The solid 
line with circles shows the average monthly percentage changes in numbers of arrivals from 
areas in the close category, while the dotted line with x is the average percentage changes in 
numbers of arrivals from areas in the intermediate category. The dotted line with triangles 
shows the average percentage changes in numbers of visitor arrivals from areas in the far 
category. The shaded area indicates the period between the confirmation of the first Middle 
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) case in the ROK (May 20, 2015) and the declaration of 
the end of the outbreak by the government of the ROK and the World Health Organization 
(December 23, 2015). The shaded dark gray area indicates the peak period of the MERS 
outbreak, and the shaded light gray area indicates the non-peak period. Note that increases in 
arrivals (i.e. positive values) before the outbreak reflect the general trend of increasing 
numbers of arrivals to the ROK.
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Table 2.
Average monthly percentage changes between 2015 actual and projected (average of 2013 and 2014) non-
citizen arrivals to the Republic of Korea (ROK) by whether the country had 100 or more severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases during the 2003 outbreak
Months The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) 
outbreak status
SARS ≥100 cases (n=5) SARS <100 cases (n=13)
p-value
% SE % SE
Jan
Before the MERS outbreak
21.7 9.8 3.0 4.9 0.934
Feb 31.1 13.6 1.7 4.3 0.954
Mar 28.4 7.8 7.5 5.8 0.973
Apr 38.5 7.0 15.4 5.2 0.988
May First MERS case reported May 20, 2015 30.2 9.9 9.2 3.5 0.952
Jun
Peak months of the MERS outbreak
−52.4 9.8 −23.3 2.9 0.018
Jul −60.0 11.0 −31.4 4.7 0.026
Aug
Non-peak months of the MERS outbreak
−28.5 7.8 −3.8 10.2 0.035
Sep 6.7 12.7 −4.4 4.7 0.776
Oct 6.5 10.6 8.1 5.1 0.446
Nov 11.4 7.5 10.3 5.7 0.548
Dec 9.5 8.6 5.7 3.3 0.655
Notes: Non-citizen arrivals are limited to non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals. Monthly percentage changes were calculated by the following 
equation.
Actual (with the MERS outbreak) − Pro jected(i f there was no MERS outbreak)
Pro jected (i f there was no MERS outbreak) × 100%
SE stands for standard error. Boldface indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05). Areas in the ≥100 SARS cases category are China, Taiwan–
China, Hong Kong SAR–China, Singapore, and Canada.
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Table 3.
Average monthly percentage changes between actual (2015) and baseline projected (average of 2013 and 
2014) non-citizen arrivals to the Republic of Korea (ROK) by distance from the ROK
Months The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) 
outbreak status
Far (n=7) Intermediate (n=7) Close (n=4)
% SE % SE p-value % SE p-value
Jan
Before the MERS outbreak
−0.4 3.4 12.5 6.5 0.946 15.8 17.7 0.787
Feb 3.0 4.6 7.2 4.8 0.730 26.7 22.9 0.811
Mar 4.6 3.9 16.1 9.0 0.863 23.5 15.6 0.843
Apr 19.9 5.0 18.2 6.9 0.422 31.5 17.2 0. 723
May First MERS case reported May 20, 2015 11.9 4.1 10.6 4.1 0.410 28.4 15.9 0.811
Jun
Peak months of the MERS outbreak
−19.5 2.9 −29.2 5.9 0.087 −56.1 9.3 0.010
Jul −17.1 2.8 −44.0 3.9 <0.001 −69.9 6.7 <0.001
Aug
Non-peak months of the MERS outbreak
−2.9 1.9 −4.2 19.3 0.474 −35.6 6.9 0.006
Sep −3.4 2.8 −4.2 8.0 0.463 7.5 17.5 0.711
Oct 6.7 1.6 8.8 9.8 0.578 7.4 13.6 0.517
Nov 6.9 1.6 15.1 10.1 0.774 9.2 11.6 0.573
Dec 6.1 1.1 5.4 6.5 0.463 10.2 10.7 0. 637
Notes: Non-citizen arrivals are limited to non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals. SE stands for standard error. Boldface indicates statistical 
significance (p-values < 0.05). The p-values are from Welch’s t-tests for two samples with unequal variances. The reference group is far. The p-
values in the intermediate column shows p-values to evaluate whether differences between the far and intermediate groups are significant, while p-
values in the close column shows p-values to evaluate whether differences between the far and close groups are significant.
Close: China, Japan, Taiwan–China, and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)–China
Intermediate: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, India, and Vietnam
Far: USA, Russia, Canada, Australia, UK, Germany, and France
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Table 4.
Monthly marginal percentage change between actual (2015) and baseline projected (average of 2013 and 
2014) non-citizen arrivals to the Republic of Korea (ROK) associated with areas that experienced ≥100 
probable severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases and distance to the Republic of Korea
Months Independent variables Coef. p-value R-squared
Jun 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 −18.3 0.032 0.68
Distance CloseIntermediate
−25.5
−9.7
0.012
0.155
Jul 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 −11.8 0.058 0.87
Distance CloseIntermediate
−45.6
−26.8
<0.001
<0.001
Aug 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 −11.7 0.595 0.41
Distance CloseIntermediate
−25.5
−1.3
0.323
0.944
Sep 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 7.5 0.593 0.08
Distance CloseIntermediate
6.4
−0.8
0.695
0.945
Oct 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 −2.2 0.876 <0.01
Distance CloseIntermediate
2.0
2.0
0.903
0.861
Nov 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 3.1 0.820 0.04
Distance CloseIntermediate
0.5
8.2
0.975
0.470
Dec 2003 SARS outbreak size (cases) SARS ≥100 2.2 0.819 0.02
Distance CloseIntermediate
2.8
−0.6
0.807
0.937
Notes: Non-citizen arrivals are limited to non-citizen short-term visitor arrivals. Boldface indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05). The results 
were from baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models using percentage changes between 2015 actual and the average of 2013 and 
2014 monthly arrivals as dependent variables. The reference category for the 2003 SARS outbreak areas with <100 probable SARS cases, and the 
reference for distance is the far category.
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